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ABSTRACT  
   
Over the years, aviation safety has been influenced by continuous 
implementations of both proactive and reactive policies by both regulatory boards and 
also, aviation service providers. This achievement has been possible mainly because of 
the safety management tools like the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) which 
derives its roots from the much earlier Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides guidelines and procedures for 
installation and development of an ASAP, for every airline in the United States. In this 
study, how different United States air carriers apply ASAP in their organizations is 
investigated.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Comparative Qualitative Research Distinguishing Safety Features among ASAPs 
in the U.S. Airlines was an attempt to obtain a deeper understanding of the ASAP and its 
implementation among the U.S. Airlines. While the primary objective of the study was to 
investigate how different U.S. carriers apply an ASAP in their organizations, the 
following literature review section is a detailed background that enabled the 
establishment of ASAPs we know today. This section explored into ASRS which was the 
first attempt to introduce safety reporting culture into the industry, and the efforts made 
by federal, industry and labor unions to make it a successful program. In the later part, 
literature focused on the Altitude Awareness Program (AAP) and its role in introducing 
ASAP into the aviation industry. The understanding of ASAP in terms of the FAA was 
analyzed and presented in the following subsection emphasizing on guidelines and 
procedures for installation of an ASAP in an organization.  
With thorough knowledge of the ASAP, its background and the FAA’s point of 
view, the study then focused on comparing the ASAPs implemented among different air 
carriers. For the purpose of sample selection of the airlines to be compared, two steps 
were considered. First, the airlines have been categorized into two types: Legacy (Case I) 
and LLC (Case II). The next step was about selecting the airline for the comparative 
study based on average annual flights (2011-2015).  
Data required for such comparison could be obtained from official public 
documents called MOUs drafted for the installation of the ASAP for the various airlines. 
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After a detailed study and analysis of the ASAP MOUs, the airlines in each of the 
category were compared separately based on the MOU elements. 
Observations and discussions have been made based on the comparative tables 
drafted from the analysis of the ASAP MOUs. Results have been stated based on the 
observations and discussions. Scope for further research and the existing challenges to 
acquire research literature and data has been discussed at the end of the qualitative 
comparative analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
On December 1, 1974, a tragic incident triggered the formation of a system for 
safety reporting in the aviation industry. This incident involved a Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) Flight 514 which was inbound to Dulles Airport and had to travel through rough 
turbulent skies which led the flight crew to misinterpret the approach chart. As a result, 
this aircraft descended below the minimum safe altitude which is specified for that 
particular area and collided with a Virginia mountain top. However, it was revealed in the 
later investigations that before this TWA crash, another United Airlines flight narrowly 
escaped a similar collision when the same approach and location were used (Greenya, 
1977). Both these incidents started to indicate the missing spoke in the wheel – safety 
reporting. This marked the beginning of the concept of safety reporting and its 
importance in the aviation industry. (Reynard, 1986) Within the context of aviation, 
safety can be defined as “the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of 
property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a 
continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management” (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2013). 
Dr. Davies of Canadian Anesthesiologists' Society defined safety reporting as the 
process of inputting the data related to the incidents which might have a possibility in 
harming persons or damaging the property. (Davies, 2015) In order to understand the 
concept of safety reporting, according to him, we must clearly understand its purpose. 
The purpose of safety reporting in the aviation industry is to ensure that an organization 
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receives safety related information which could then be used to manage and improve 
safety within that organization. (Davies, 2015; Cicero, 2008)  
According to Mahajan, one of the first ever investigations of critical incidents in 
aviation was done by Flanagan as early as the 1940s (Mahajan, 2010). The primary 
objective of his investigation was to improve safety and performance among the military 
pilots (Flanagan, 1954). It is also important to understand that the safety department or 
organization would have had different sources of data such as reports from their staff, 
surveillance technologies, and other administrative databases. Among these sources, 
reports from the working community were regarded as the most critical (Davies, 2015). A 
good quality report must be presented in such a way that it should allow a detailed 
analysis of the chain of events that lead to the incident. This report must be able to 
capture the clinical incidents highlighting the areas of information necessary to 
understand the cause of the event (Mahajan, 2010).  
According to NASA, as the reports were collected, analyzing them carefully to 
identify the risks involved in the system and recommending the necessary changes within 
or outside the system in to minimize the risk were the primary duties of an analyst. 
Implementing the recommended changes and acknowledging the reporter about the 
reception of the report was the next crucial step in the ASRS (NASA, 2015). 
  To improve feedback, the organizations could also convey that the corrective 
changes were brought about by the information attained from the reports, which would 
have the potential to develop a positive attitude among the working staff about reporting 
(Reed, 2014). In addition, if the processed information could be shared among the various 
organizations, both federal and privately owned, at both the national and international 
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levels, the safety culture would spread easily and effectively (Bower, 1966). The whole 
idea was about spreading the safety related knowledge with the help of processed 
information from the reported data. Disseminating safety information in this manner 
should have considered the inter-dependencies between the various organizational 
departments and systems (Bailey, 1977).   
The safety department or organization could be successful only when the 
employees were able to report freely and to the best of their knowledge, being aware that 
the reporting system was non punitive and safe. In this way, a mature safety environment 
could be constructed within the organization (Westrum, 2004). Also, when the employees 
were trained to be proactive in safety discrepancies, and rewarded by the organization 
when they do so, the organization could build an even stronger safety culture (Westrum, 
2004; Davies, 2015). 
Development of Aviation Safety Action Programs - Aviation Safety Reporting 
System 
ASRS is one of the safety tools initially founded to retrieve first hand data relating 
to safety incidents and accidents. It is in fact the world’s largest confidential voluntary 
aviation reporting system. This government program can be referred to as an example of 
how interagency co-operation can create a successful, stable and most efficient agent for 
safety improvements in an ever-changing political scenario (NASA, 2014; Billings, 
1976). 
The ASRS was founded in 1976 through a Memorandum of Agreement between 
the FAA and NASA. It was during this time that the proactive safety or process based 
safety was gaining importance. Therefore, the priority was to design a system to 
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eliminate the unsafe conditions during the flight operations and also to prevent avoidable 
accidents and incidents in the entire National Aviation System (NAS) (Billings, 1999). 
But there were some immediate concerns for the FAA to implement the new 
system into the aviation community. In the ASRS, pilots, air traffic controllers, flight 
attendants, mechanics, ground personnel, and others involved in the aviation operations 
submit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, an incident or 
situation in which aviation safety may have been compromised. Although all submissions 
are voluntary, the FAA realized that it’s regulatory and enforcement rules would make 
the aviation community reluctant to trust and utilize the new platform (Reynard, 1986; 
Eisenbraun, 1981). 
In order to find a solution to this problem, the FAA then approached NASA to act 
as a highly respected third party that would administer the program and attend to the 
interests of both sides. NASA accepted the FAA’s proposal to begin this interagency co-
operation program in 1976. NASA has been administering the program’s details which 
has included: overseeing its products and services, guaranteeing confidentiality and 
ensuring that the analysis results were communicated to the responsible safety 
departments (Billings, 1999; Corrie, 1997). 
Thus, the then final version of the ASRS had following objectives when it was 
founded (Billings, 1976): 
 To prevent accidents and fatalities. 
 To be a properly structured confidential, voluntary, non-punitive incident 
reporting system. 
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 Exclusion from its protections some types of incidents, such as criminal 
acts and intentional unsafe acts including legally defined accidents such as 
hijacking, bombing and so on. 
 Utilization of safety data gathered from incident reporting to identify 
system vulnerabilities and gain a better understanding of the root causes of 
human error (complementary to the data generated by mandatory, 
statistical, and monitoring systems)  
 To ask, and frequently answer, the question of why. There is no substitute 
for knowing why a system failed or why a human erred. 
The ASRS can also be defined as a system that combines number of different air 
carriers throughout the U.S. aviation body. The sole purpose of this system was to 
“collect, analyze, and respond to voluntarily submitted aviation safety reports in order to 
lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents” (NASA, 2015). 
The data collected was used to identify the inadequacies and discrepancies in the 
NAS which could then be referred to responsible authorities. This valuable data collected 
by ASRS could further be used by the federal administration in support to policy 
formulation and planning thus improving NAS as a whole (Connell, 2000). The very 
foundations of the human factor safety could be strengthened using data collected by 
ASRS (NASA, 2015). The following sections explain the important features of ASRS 
that helped in its success and carried forward into ASAP. 
Confidentiality. The success of the ASRS program (see figure 1) could be easily 
related to this important factor: confidentiality (NASA, 2015). As noted above, 
involving NASA as an administrator has successfully resolved the reluctance 
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from the potential participants in the system who were uneasy with the possibility 
that the voluntary reports could be used against them (NASA, 2015). 
In April 2016, the NASA ASRS celebrated its 40th year of continuous 
operation in service to aviation safety. During its 40- year history, the ASRS has 
processed over 1.3 million reports and returned valuable information to the 
aviation community through a wealth of safety products. 
ASRS's report intake has been robust from the first days of the program, in 
which it averaged approximately 400 reports per month (See Figure 1). In recent 
years, report intake has grown at an enormous rate. Intake now averages 1,774 
reports per week and more than 7,686 reports per month. These reports were 
voluntarily submitted by pilots, air traffic controllers, dispatchers, cabin crew, 
maintenance technicians, and others from all over the NAS (NASA, 2016). 
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Figure 1.  Monthly Report Intake for ASRS program. (Source: ASRS website) 
 
The voluntary reports from the aviation community were stripped of the 
personal identification information before the contents were released for analysis. 
However general information such as dates, times, locations, weather conditions, 
etcetera were generalized or eliminated since it might have been useful in 
understanding the event (Billings, 1999). 
Immunity. Another contributing factor for the success of ASRS was the 
immunity factor, which was backed by the FAA. Their immunity policy 
encouraged submission of all safety incidents, observations and information, 
specifically that could avert a major mishap (Federal Aviation Administration, 
1997). 
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However, neither immunity, nor the confidentiality extended to situations 
involving accidents or criminal activity. In Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46D, 
FAR91.25, and paragraph 2-38 in the “Facility Operations and Administration 
Handbook”, several limitations to the program are directly and specifically 
addressed: 
The filing of a report with NASA……………………. certificate suspension 
will be imposed…………….to NASA under ASRS (FAA AC 00-46D). 
The individual reporting voluntarily may not be punished or disciplined when: 
 the violation was inadvertent and not deliberate; 
 the violation did not involve a criminal offense and accident, or 
action; 
 the person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement 
action for a period of 5 years prior to the date of occurrence; and 
 the person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, he or she 
completed and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident 
or occurrence to NASA under ASRS.  
Another section of AC 00-46D mentioned critical information about use of 
the reports against enforcement purposes: 
PROHIBITION AGAINST………. 
Federal Aviation Regulations……………. action, except information 
concerning…………………. security system is designed………………NASA 
management. 
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The above section of the AC 00-46D prevented any misuse of the database 
reports to harm the individuals in question and ensures that the voluntary reports 
and the employees are safe. 
Reporting Procedures. Employees could report by both means of electronic and 
conventional writing to NASA. Required reporting forms were available for 
download from the website, and there were separate forms for pilots, mechanics, 
cabin crew, and air traffic controllers (Connell, 2011). For electronic method, 
employees could securely send aviation safety reports to ASRS via the internet. 
An additional note has been displayed on ASRS website portal: 
NOTE: The identification strips at the..........following report 
transmission……… submission (NASA, 2015). 
ASRS thus notified employees that the information provided by them is 
de-identified while it is fed into the system. 
The ASRS also categorized the data input into four major groups and has 
different report forms for each category. The grouping into these categories was 
based on the occupational background: 
 General Form: Pilots, Dispatchers and other Airport Personnel 
 ATC Report Form: Air Traffic Controllers 
 Maintenance Report Form: Repairmen, Mechanics, Inspectors  
 Cabin Report Form: Cabin Crew (NASA, 2015) 
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Analysis of Reports. The ASRS has successfully and securely analyzed over 1.3 
million reports in its 40-year history. The analysis of reports in ASRS was a 
process that contains critical factors that made sure that each report maintained 
reporter confidentiality and at the same time enhanced the ability to determine the 
safety value of the reports (NASA, 2015). 
The process began with the picking up of ASRS paper reports on a daily 
basis from the Moffett Field Post Office. The reports could also be submitted 
electronically, through Electric Report Submission (ERS) website or ASAP data 
transmissions. Based on the date of the receipt, every report was date and time 
stamped. The reports were then identified and categorized by the analysts 
according to the priority levels. If the analysts at ASRS recognized hazardous 
situations from the reports, they issued an alert message. The potential corrective 
actions along with related de-identified information were forwarded to the 
authoritative organizations (NASA ASRS Program Briefing, 2013). The alerting 
messages (See Table 1) sent out by analysts contained safety information to the 
organizations in positions of authority so that they could analyze the information 
and generate possible corrective actions (Billings, 1999; NASA, 2015). 
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Table 1  
Outcome of Safety Alerts from ASRS (NASA ASRS Program Briefing, 2013) 
Alerting Subjects Total Number of Alerting Messages 
Sent 
Aircraft Systems 718 
Airports Facility Status and Maintenance 471 
ATC Procedures 230 
Airport Lighting and Approach Aids 151 
ATC Equipment 123 
ATC Operations 75 
Hazards to Flight 64 
Navigation 37 
Aircraft Power Plants 36 
Aircraft Avionics 35 
Others 272 
 
Table 1 shows the number of alerting messages sent by ASRS analysts for each alerting 
subject till 2015.  
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Development of Altitude Awareness Program 
Among the aviators during the 1980s, there was a well-known common term 
called “altitude bust”. It is often referred for the pilot deviation from assigned altitude. 
However, the results of an altitude bust could vary from federal violations for crew 
members to fatal accidents like midair collisions. There were incidents where passengers 
and crew sustained injuries due to the rapid flight maneuvers to recover from the altitude 
deviation (Thomas M. Granda, 1991; Sumwalt, 1995). 
For the FAA and other aviation researchers to understand the problem, the only 
available data was through ASRS. During the years 1983 to 1994, ASRS received a total 
of 74,544 reports involving altitude deviations. However, all ASRS reports were 
voluntarily submitted, and thus could not be considered as a measure of random sample 
for the full population like events. Thus the number 74,544 may comprise over half of all 
the altitude deviations which occur, or it may be just a tiny portion of the total 
occurrences. It was evident that the ASRS statistics only represent the lower measure of 
the true number of events which have been occurring. (Sumwalt, 1995) 
This encouraged the FAA to conduct an independent study called altitude 
deviation data-collection program, in which the pilots and controllers of U.S. Airways 
were encouraged to report the altitude bust events directly to study’s researchers in 
addition to the usual ASRS reporting. The statistics now had a value suggesting that to 
reduce the flight altitude busts, there is a necessity to develop a flight-crew centered 
program within the U.S. Airways (Thomas M. Granda, 1991). 
In order to encourage the employees of the air carriers to participate in the 
program, the FAA has made an effort to include incentives which includes protection 
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against punishment for committing the possible violations of 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). This makes the reporting non-punitive and protects them from 
company disciplinary actions. The events reported under these programs were organized 
under Voluntary Disclosure Policy (Chidester, 2007). 
There were other shortcomings from the ASRS program which were noticed by 
the service operators as well as the FAA. The FAA recognized that the information 
submitted to the ASRS goes directly to NASA bypassing the service provider and the 
regulator (FAA). It would take reasonable amount of time for the analysts at the ASRS to 
analyze the reports and issue a warning against a potential threat. Some threats faced by 
the service provider were to be identified quickly to make decisions on the possible 
corrective actions. So instead of depending upon ASRS, if there was a safety department 
within the organization backed by the regulator (FAA), the corrective actions would have 
been quicker to evade the potential threat achieving the safety goals of the company 
(Harper, 2011). 
Also, ASRS reports were completely stripped of the personal identification before 
being sent to analysis under the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) that govern the 
ASRS. Although this regulation was brought into action to win the trust of the 
employees, it was difficult for the service providers to gather additional information for 
the design of corrective actions on their own to mitigate the threat and the risks 
associated with it. Service providers were able to witness the necessity of the availability 
of identified safety reports to understand the safety concerns directly from the employees 
to be able to provide a positive feedback or a corrective action (Harper, 2011). 
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Soon later, Several U.S. air carriers developed AAPs to prevent crew-caused 
altitude deviations. For example, U.S. Airways in just 14 months following the program’s 
inclusion has recorded a fifty percent reduction in the rate of altitude deviations. This 
value was considered statistically significant by the FAA researchers. The success stories 
of these programs had spread across the other U.S. carriers who began to adopt the new 
aspects and safety culture within their organizations (Cacciabue, 2000). 
The success of these programs had paved a way for the FAA to release a revised 
AC in the name of the ASAPs (AC ASAP) in the year 2000. This article established 
industry-wide guidelines for the airline participation in the ASAP. This guidance was a 
revised and collective effort of airline companies, labor associations and the FAA 
management (FAA, 2016). 
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Aviation Safety Action Programs 
ASAP was basically an information program held by the partnership between the 
FAA, an airline and possible third parties such as labor unions (FAA AC 120-66B 2002). 
The common goal of all ASAPs was to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of 
accidents and incidents (Federal Aviation Administration, 1997). The American Airlines 
were the first airline to institute this program in 1994 (NTSB, 1999). 
The purpose of this program was to provide airline employees and other aviation 
service operator employees, an opportunity to report safety related problems, including 
self-made errors to their respective safety departments voluntarily without the risk of 
incurring punitive charges. As mentioned previously, ASAP was initially started by a 
handful of airlines. These airlines have installed ASAP with a vision that the tools to their 
safety operations would require the identification of forthcoming hazardous or high risk 
associated potential threats. These airlines also believed that only their employees, who 
were operating on a daily basis in the National Airspace System would be able to provide 
such identification and firsthand information (Griffith, 1998). They further believed by 
the airlines that they themselves were able to provide information about the safety issues 
immediately and were in a position to develop corrective actions based on the issues that 
have been reported (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011). 
American Airlines were the first among the airlines to install the ASAP which 
was then referred to as the Aviation Safety Action Partnership. The only source for safety 
related information for this program was through mandatory reports filed by the pilots 
which were required in the event violating a FAR. The pilots used to provide a voluntary 
disclosed report to the airline if the reporter felt that the information was vital enough to 
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place themselves in the line of potential punitive action. Since the ASAP program offers 
incentives against the standard FAA legal enforcement policies and internal company 
disciplinary action, there was a supportive response from the airlines and the employees 
to the introduction of the ASAP (Ganter, 2000). 
Although this program shared some common features with ASRS, ASAP also marks the 
beginning of significant departure from normal FAA enforcement actions. ASRS offered 
limited protection to the employees who provided safety information including the errors 
committed by themselves. For example, in case of pilots, ASRS offers protection from 
suspension of a pilot’s certificate but not from potential federal punitive actions when 
involved in violation of the FAR. However, in ASAP the reporter for an accepted report 
is offered protection from federal punitive action, provided the reporter did not commit 
actions that implicate an intentional disregard for safety (Stolzer A. H., 2008). 
 Along with protection from federal punitive actions, under ASAP employees got 
additional incentives. These include provision of a platform for the employees to report 
their safety concerns that they might have experienced from an incident. This platform 
also provided opportunity for an employee to report ongoing problems that may lead to a 
high risk associated potential hazards or threats. ASAP reporting thus included different 
types of reports from the employees who could not only report their errors but also safety 
concerns that are encountered during operations which could lead to serious events 
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011). 
 The program gradually expanded to include other employee groups including 
dispatchers, flight attendants, maintenance employees, load controllers, flight following 
support and ground personnel (Ganter, 2000). As of October 2016, the ASAP program 
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constituted of 172 participants that includes commercial airlines, business aviation 
companies, maintenance service providers and other aviation service providers (FAA, 
2016).  
The following section focuses on the three major aspects that would aid in 
regulating the ASAP in accordance with FAA. 
Federal Aviation Administration’s Elements of ASAP.  
Employee Review Committee (ERC). The ERC is a group that consists of 
representatives from different groups involved in the program. The committee 
members typically include: 
 a management representative from the certificate holder,  
 a representative from the employee labor association (if applicable), and  
 a specifically qualified FAA inspector from the CHDO (Certificate 
Holding District Office). 
The consensus of this group is responsible for review and analysis of 
the reports posted through ASAP and determines whether the reports meet the 
requirements (as mentioned in FAA AC 120-66B) in order to include them 
into ASAP. 
Consensus of the ERC is the voluntary agreement by the committee’s 
representatives for each decision required by the MOU in ASAP. The following 
example would help in understanding the necessity of an ERC in the program: 
The ERC of an ASAP should make effort to reach a consensus on the 
recommended corrective actions to counter reported safety threats such as an 
operating deficiency or airworthiness discrepancy.  
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The ERC takes responsibility to determine the corrective action necessary 
to counter the safety-related threat based on review and analysis of the reports 
submitted under the ASAP. The corrective actions could be in the form of a 
requirement to complete a training course. For example, in case of pilots, a 
corrective action could be in the form of a repeated training or as serious as a 
requirement to complete a flight where the pilot’s skills are reviewed. The 
corrective actions to mitigate the safety risks are the results of collective effort 
involving appropriate departments of the company as well as FAA that have the 
expertise and responsibility in the areas concerning the safety of that particular 
airline. Also, the FAA representative in the ERC plays a vital role in decision 
making in case where there is no consensus of the ERC on a particular report.  
Similar to the ASRS, this group may share and exchange information that 
they have acquired during the analysis. ERC also deals with the identification of 
potential or actual safety problems from the reported data (FAA, 2002). 
Memorandum of Understanding. As the name suggests, this document of the 
ASAP program establishes the agreement between the employees, management 
and the regulator. The entire program is therefore implemented in accordance 
with the provisions of its MOU. Each MOU would be based on the requirements 
of the parties involved in the formation of an ASAP. It is also important to note 
that ASAP reports accepted by the ERC under an active MOU may no longer 
require any FAA administrative action (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002). 
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Elements of MOU are crucial to determine the type and status of the 
ASAP managed by an Airline. These elements are mentioned below as stated and 
defined by FAA in AC 120-66B: 
1. The identification of what type of operator the program applies to: Part 
121 Air Carrier or a Major Domestic Repair Station. 
2. The identification of the type of program and the employee group(s) to 
whom it pertains. The types of programs are Demonstration Program, 
Renewal of Demonstration Program, Continuing Program, or Renewal 
of a Continuing Program. 
3. The duration of the program should be limited to the period of time 
needed to achieve the desired goals and benefits articulated in the 
program. Demonstration programs initially should have a duration of 
no longer than 18 months and should be reviewed prior to renewal. 
Demonstration programs that undergo changes after their initial review 
may be renewed for no longer than 12 months. Programs that are 
classified as Continuing must be reviewed and renewed every 2 years. 
4. A statement that all parties to the ASAP have entered into this 
agreement voluntarily. 
5. A description of the objective(s) including the essential safety 
information that is reasonably expected to be obtained through the 
program, any specific safety issues that are of a concern to any of the 
parties, and the benefits to be gained through the use of the program. 
  22 
6. A description of any enforcement-related incentive that is needed to 
achieve the desired goal and results of the program. 
7. A statement that all safety-related reports shall be fully evaluated and, 
to the extent appropriate, investigated by the ERC. 
8. A description of the manner in which ASAP records and reports shall 
be kept. ASAP records and reports shall be kept in a manner 
acceptable to the ERC and described in the MOU. 
9. A description of the process for timely reporting to the FAA all events 
disclosed under the program. 
10. A description of the procedures for the resolution of those events that 
are safety-related, and procedures for continuous tracking and analysis 
of safety-related events. 
11. A description of the ERC ASAP Report acceptance and exclusion 
criteria. 
12. A description of the frequency of periodic reviews by the parties to 
determine whether the program is achieving the desired results. These 
reviews are in addition to any other review conducted by the FAA or 
any other party individually. 
13. Identification of the point(s) of contact within each party who is 
responsible for oversight of the program.  
14. A description of the process for training and distributing information 
about the program to certificate holder employees and procedures for 
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providing feedback to individuals who make safety-related reports 
under the program. 
Out of the total 27 mentioned elements of MOU, these 14 elements are 
clinical to our comparative study. As of 2015, a total of 383 active Memorandums 
of Understanding exist across the United States (FAA, 2016). 
Reporting Criteria. Similar to ASRS, neither immunity, nor the confidentiality 
benefits can be availed by the employees involving accidents or criminal activity. The 
FAA AC120-66B states the following under the “Criteria for Acceptance”: 
(1) The employee must submit a report in a timely manner. In order to 
be considered timely, a report must be submitted in accordance 
with either of the following two criteria:  
a. Within a time period following the event that is defined in the 
MOU, such as within 24 hours of the end of the duty day in 
which the event occurred. If this criterion has been met, a 
report would not be rejected for timeliness, even if the FAA 
was already aware of the possible noncompliance with the 
regulations, and may have brought it to the attention of the 
employee;  
b. Within 24 hours of having become aware of possible 
noncompliance with 14 CFR in accordance with the following 
criteria: If a report is submitted later than the time period after 
the occurrence of an event stated in the MOU, the ERC will 
review all available information to determine whether the 
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employee knew or should have known about the possible 
noncompliance with 14 CFR within that time period. If the 
employee did not know or could not have known about the 
apparent noncompliance with 14 CFR within that time period, 
then the report would be included in ASAP, provided the report 
is submitted within 24 hours of having become aware of 
possible noncompliance with 14 CFR, and provided all other 
ASAP acceptance criteria have been met. If the employee knew 
or should have known about the apparent noncompliance with 
14 CFR, then the report will not be included in ASAP.  
(2) The alleged regulatory violation must be inadvertent, and must not 
appear to involve an intentional disregard for safety. 
(3) The reported event must not appear to involve criminal activity, 
substance abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional 
falsification.  
(4) Sole-source reports that meet all of the above acceptance criteria 
except timely submission will be accepted under ASAP. 
ASAP Information. To report safety-related events, ASAP provides a great 
platform for the employees of an operator. As per the FAA regulations all 
individual ASAP reports must be signed by each employee seeking the 
enforcement incentives provided by ASAP. There are usually two types of reports 
generally submitted under FAA (FAA, 2016): 
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1. Safety-related reports that appear to involve one or more violations 
of the FAR. 
2. Reports that identify a general safety concern, but do not appear to 
violate a FAR. 
An example for the first type of report mentioned above can be an attitude 
deviation which means a pilot deviating from the Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
assigned altitude. Whereas an example for the second type of report can be a 
flight-crew member’s concern that there’s a possible error in an operational 
procedure or the design of the flight checklist could lead to an error. 
FAA recommends that each ASAP report must contain detailed 
information about a safety incident so that it can be evaluated by the analysts. In 
FAA order 8000-82, the following is mentioned regarding ASAP reports: 
If the report is submitted by a flight crewmember, and the safety event 
involves a deviation from an ATC clearance, the ASAP report would include the 
date, time, place, altitude, flight number, and ATC frequency, along with a 
description of the safety-related event. 
The ASAP is expected to generate a lot of safety information from the 
airlines’ employees which may not be obtainable from any other way. This 
information which is obtained from the ASAP participants is the key to identify 
actual or potential risks throughout their operations. After the identification 
process, the parties of an ASAP can implement the corrective actions in order to 
reduce the potential for occurrence of accidents, incidents and other safety-related 
events (FAA, 2016). 
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In order to make most of an ASAP in terms of safety information, FAA 
recommends certificate holders to develop programs compatible data collection, 
analysis, storage, and retrieval systems. The retrieved safety information can be 
utilized as a measure of aviation system safety according to FAA experts (Harper 
M., 2003). 
The ASAP systems are not just designed for pilots, instead the system 
encourages various employee groups such as flight-crew members, mechanics, 
flight attendants and dispatchers. The de-identified ASAP data from these 
employee groups is used by the parties of the MOU to identify data trends 
concerning safety issues. To counter these adverse trends, MOU takes 
responsibility in designing appropriate corrective actions to be undertaken 
(Harper, 2011). New data is then gathered and utilized in measuring the 
effectiveness of those recommended corrective actions. If better correction actions 
are required, they are devised and executed. This process continues until the 
safety goals are met. Furthermore, data is used to monitor long term success and 
ensure that there is no recurrence (FAA, 2016). 
FAA provides freedom to ASAP participants in development of data 
acquisition, event categorization and risk analysis schemes. However, regarding 
the sharing of the safety information, FAA representatives are to make sure that 
the ERC counterparts and ASAP manager have a proper understanding about 
development and implementation of a voluntary national information sharing 
system. For an airline, in order to participate in voluntary sharing of ASAP 
information, the type of safety events and recommended corrective actions must 
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be organized into classified information according to the employee groups within 
the airline (Chidester, 2007). 
For a given employee group, an airline can also adopt a national 
classification theme instead of creating a new one in order to participate in the 
information sharing at a national level. However, it not mandatory for an airline to 
adopt a national classification at internally within the airline if it wanted to 
participate in the information sharing system at national level. But the ASAP 
participants who wish to take part in a national information sharing will need to 
tailor their events to the agreed upon national scheme for a given employee group. 
The ASAP manager, Air Carrier Training Systems (ACTS) and Voluntary Safety 
Programs Branch (VSPB) possess the information about the national information 
sharing systems (FAA, 2016). 
Research studies by Weick and Sutcliffe emphasize the importance of 
collection of information from operators and sharing the information throughout 
the communities in order to enhance safety in operations. Their study also suggest 
that a safe organization is the one which supports this cycle of information 
sharing and distribution from one operator (Weick, 2007).  
Confidentiality. The only obstruction to share the ASAP information with the 
FAA is the aviation industry’s concern over public disclosure of the information 
which if disclosed, there is a great potential for safety information to be misused 
against them. As a result, certificate holders have not permitted ASAP reports and 
related information to leave the certificate holder’s premises and except for ASAP 
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information made available to review by the FAA representative who is a part of 
the ERC, which is held at certificate holder’s place of business only.  
Presently no ASAP information is submitted to FAA. The ASAP 
information is considered confidential by the participating certificate holders and 
employees who are involved in the program (FAA, 2016). 
However, the FAA does not allow that ASAP MOUs should remain 
confidential under normal circumstances. FAA explains in its order released in 
2003 that since the MOU involves an agreement to provide incentives like 
providing protection even from the federal violations, which otherwise involves 
enforcement actions, the public has a right to know the provisions of an MOU on 
the basis of which the FAA has changed its enforcement policy (FAA, 2016). 
Let us now take a look at how the different aviation employee groups like 
maintenance adopted ASAP in order to promote safety culture within their 
respective organizations. 
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Maintenance ASAP 
The late 1980s marked the beginning of social and organizational psychology, 
work sociology, and anthropology in the area of aviation maintenance. Maintenance 
Resource Management (MRM) is a collection of the above mentioned behavioral and 
social sciences. MRM has been gaining momentum among the employees as well as the 
organizations (Taylor, 2000). The social scientists working for the government and the 
industry were reporting that maintenance has an impact on safety of flight. In 1986, 
Wiegers and Rosman in their report have mentioned that about 39% of the wide-body 
aircrafts have been involved in accidents which began with a problem in aircraft systems 
and maintenance, and that “pilot error” comes later in the sequence of events that led to 
the accident (Wiegers, 1986). These reports and claims led to the formation of the 
Maintenance Resource Management Roundtables conducted at U.S. Airways (Taylor J., 
1998). This MRM Roundtable consisted of a representative from the company, a 
representative from the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
(IAMAW), the FAA Principal Maintenance/Avionics Inspector and the mechanic or 
mechanics who committed the error.  
The MOU was signed between the company and the FAA that would establish 
that the purpose of the roundtable was to collect critical safety information that would not 
have come if not for the honest participation by the person who committed the error. This 
approach by the companies proved to be successful as they were able to create a proper 
understanding of the casual factors leading to the error instead of playing the blame game 
which was prevalent at that time (Graeber, 1994). 
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The labor union also began to trust the three-member team as they were truly 
implementing comprehensive and systemic solutions. As the result of the formation of 
this group, several key issues regarding maintenance were solved without punishing the 
reporting employees or FAA enforcement consequences. However, at this time, the 
roundtable system was only practiced at the U.S. Airways and it was not easy to duplicate 
the system at the other companies since their managers and other FAA inspectors were 
not co-operative with the adoption of such systems (Taylor J., 1998). 
Aviation mechanics working for companies other than U.S. Airways therefore did 
not have access to a roundtable discussion. But, they had two other options, i.e., they 
could either submit reports to ASRS or submit a voluntary self-disclosure report to the 
company using the guidance from FAA. The ASRS may provide limited protection to the 
individual reporter but the reporter’s safety concern cannot be answered by the company 
management or the FAA since all individual reports sent to ASRS were de-identified 
(NASA, 2015). The voluntary self-disclosure report in accordance with FAA AC 00-58 
was perceived by the industry as primarily an organizational level disclosure rather than 
an individual level disclosure. It was so because the FAA AC was designed for generic 
reporting for federal regulation violation for all employee groups but not for maintenance 
employees in particular (Patankar, 2004). 
Extensive research in the areas of error causation due to human factors have 
supported the fact that the worker who committed the error is the best source for the key 
information that is crucial to the development of a true comprehensive solution (Battles, 
Kaplan, Schaaf, & Shea, 1998; Harper M., 2003). Until and unless there is an effective 
non-punitive reporting system such that the reporting mechanic has an incentive in return 
  31 
for disclosing his/her error, the safety concerns hovering around maintenance division 
were difficult to address in the rest of the industry. 
Since the ASAP for pilots was already in place, FAA issued guidance materials to 
develop Maintenance ASAP agreements to provide a non-punitive forum for mechanics 
to come forward and disclose their errors to the FAA and the air carrier which would 
enable the implementation of systemic solutions. Additionally, due to similarity in 
causes, similar errors could be minimized by distributing the safety data within the 
organization (Patankar, 2004). 
The maintenance ASAP deals with the aviation maintenance community as the 
sources of the safety information. The primary objective here is to develop and assess the 
ASAP programs among the maintenance communities of the different organizations. The 
nature of aviation maintenance is such that it involves humongous human-machine 
interaction, and therefore safety is very closely related to technology and human 
reliabilities on both hardware and maintenance personnel respectively. ASAP provides 
the perfect platform for collecting the safety information through a non-punitive reporting 
system (FAA, 2009). 
An ASAP is a program that uses an effective system to (FAA, 2009): 
 improve the maintenance system so that the remaining maintenance 
professionals would not commit similar mistakes, 
 build a reporting culture allowing a non-punitive flow of information 
between the reporter and management producing a systematic solution so 
that others are not placed in a similar situation, and 
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 reduce the probability of a catastrophic accidents such as accidents 
involving loss of lives. 
Due to its success with the maintenance division, ASAP was set to enter into 
other aviation employee groups such as Flight Dispatchers, Flight Attendants and Ramp 
Agents (Ground Support) (Patankar, 2004). Since the information involved with the 
ASAPs are considered confidential by the certificate holder, we do not have access to that 
information. However, the ASAP MOUs are cleared by the FAA to be made public 
(FAA, 2016). For the proposed comparative study, a qualitative research is chosen. The 
following section is a briefing about comparative qualitative research. 
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Qualitative Research 
A qualitative research can be defined as an empirical or scientific way of 
understanding a phenomenon (R Bogdan, 1987). Many qualitative studies take form into 
case studies that examine certain in-depth “purposive samples” to understand a 
phenomenon in a better way. The best examples of such studies can be found in (Stake, 
1995) and (Yin, 1989). Also, such case studies could be utilized in evaluating specific 
government policies as they provide more flexibility even in smaller samples. One best 
example for this can be Policy, Program Evaluation and Research in Disability by Racino 
in 1999 (Racino, 1999). 
According to Taylor and Bogdan, the most commonly used data sources by 
qualitative researchers are public and official documents, literature fields and other 
research literatures (S J Taylor, 1984). The data sources must then be filtered for required 
information and written into a report using descriptions, charts and tables to demonstrate 
the study findings (Merriam, 2009). 
Once the researcher has the data, the next step would be analysis of the data and 
recording observations by utilizing the tables and charts drawn from the data collected. 
This technique is called interpretive technique, which is most commonly used in 
qualitative research. In this technique, the subject area expert examines the data, 
interprets the data by forming an impression and finally reports the impression in a 
systematic and structured form. This phenomenon is also known as observer impression 
(MIT qualitative research, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to outline the search strategy and selection criteria 
applied for this comparative qualitative research. It primarily provides descriptions of 
types of documents, studies and research papers reviewed, and the comparative methods 
used. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Relevant research containing safety reporting and aviation safety were identified by 
searching several multidisciplinary databases including medical databases. A total of 27 
databases were searched for publications from 1940s through the present, with key 
articles obtained from NASA ASRS public database, ProQuest, MEDLINE and the FAA 
public document database. A complete list of the databases searched is included in 
Appendix C. 
Also, in order to make sure that the relevant studies were not missed, the search terms 
were maintained to be broad enough. Some of these terms were “safety and airlines”, 
“pilots’ safety”, “safety in aviation maintenance”, “safety awareness programs” and 
“reporting among airlines” anywhere in the title or the document. For the purpose of 
restricting the search for U.S. Aviation Industry, language restriction was implemented. 
(only English language was preferred). Peer reviewed papers were preferred to a 
maximum extent. Studies were eligible in consideration for the literature only if: 
a. the focus of the paper was on safety reporting, and 
b. there was at least one reference in the paper pertaining to aviation industry.   
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  Communication with researchers from the other universities and organizations has 
revealed that there is a lot of scope for literature regarding aviation safety in unpublished 
research. In order to capture the knowledge from these unpublished work, personal 
contact was made with research analysts at ALPA, ASRS, NASA and research professors 
at universities such as Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach and Purdue 
University. 
However, the policy and guideline information about the ASAP had to be retrieved from 
the FAA website portal. Similarly, policy and guideline information about the ASRS had 
to be retrieved from the ASRS web portal which is maintained by NASA. 
Comparative Study 
Since the U.S. Aviation Industry was vast, a small sample was required to run the 
comparative analysis. In order to get a good sample size, the airlines were categorized 
into Legacy Carriers and LCC. As a part of sample selection the average annual flight 
operations (2011-2015) was selected as a factor. This data was retrieved from U.S. 
Department of Transportation website. Based on this, two of the legacy carriers American 
Airlines and United Airlines were selected. Similarly, Virgin America, Spirit Airlines and 
Frontier Airlines are selected from the Low Cost Carrier bunch. To study the 
implementation of ASAP among the selected airlines, a common criterion was required 
which is followed by all the airlines. The FAA regulated MOUs are chosen for two 
reasons: 
a. Standardized document that describes certain safety features of the ASAP 
program. 
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b. Publicly available document and hence not violating the confidentiality of the 
ASAP information. 
Data collection regarding MOUs was most difficult part of the study. Only two 
MOUs were made available to public on the internet which belonged to United Airlines 
and American Airlines. Rigorous attempts were made to correspond with the ASAP 
managers of the selected airlines. After several failed attempts, personal contacts from the 
labor organizations (anonymity requested) and the airlines helped retrieving pieces of 
information sufficient enough to generate a MOU from the FAA web portal itself. This 
method was applied to Virgin America, Spirit Airlines and Frontier Airlines. 
Further, only some of the elements were picked from the MOUs which were 
comparable with the other airlines. The elements are then listed out and recorded in the 
form of tables to visually distinguish the safety features of the respective ASAP 
programs. Observations based on these comparative tables were made explaining how 
airlines differed from each other in implementing ASAPs. Discussion based on these 
observations followed based on the prior knowledge of the ASAP and the concepts of 
safety reporting. Hypothesis Statement, and case wise results are stated in further 
sections.    
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARITIVE STUDY 
To fulfill the primary purpose of this study, the comparative qualitative research 
study shall be conducted among different U.S. carriers. The purpose of this qualitative 
research is to understand the application of the phenomenon (ASAP) among the carriers 
in the United States. 
The source of information to understand the phenomenon i.e., ASAP are the 
official MOU documents. In order to design a structured data set, 14 of the 27 ASAP 
MOU elements have been chosen which can be found in Memorandum of Understanding 
section of this document. The air carriers registered in the U.S. are divided into two 
categories for a structured qualitative study:  
Case I – Legacy Carriers 
Case II – Low Cost Carriers 
 The reason airlines have been classified into these categories as they both differ 
broadly from inflight services to annual operations. The core principle of the LCC was to 
shed down the additional operational costs such as stripping their business class, catering, 
and others to provide a marginal cost to the costumers. Whereas the legacy carriers 
usually have fixed costs in operating the flights and hence tend to have more than just the 
marginal costs. 
Most of the legacy airlines use wide-body bigger airplanes as most of their flights 
are usually medium to long haul. But, the LCC business models tend to use the narrow-
body aircrafts as they mostly operate short to medium haul flights (Holloway, 2012). 
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Hypothesis Statement 
All U.S. Airlines have standardized Aviation Safety Action Programs which 
include all employee groups respectively.  
As mentioned earlier, the ASAP information is considered confidential by the 
participant certificate holder. However, ASAP MOU is exempted by the FAA from 
confidentiality. Thus, we shall use MOU as a tool to perform comparative analysis 
among the ASAPs of the selected airlines. 
Case I – Legacy Carriers 
In this case, among the legacy carriers in the U.S., based on the annual operations, 
American Airlines and United airlines have been chosen for the study. The annual 
operations average was taken for 5 years between 2011 and 2015 (See Table 2). The data 
was retrieved from U.S. Department of Transportation website. Table 2 describes the 
comparison of annual operations among Delta, American and United Airlines. 
Table 2 –  
List of Legacy Carriers along with their respective average annual flights (2011-2015) 
Airlines  Average Annual Flights 
 
American Airlines 
Delta Airlines 
United Airlines 
 
564,865 
775,383 
467,677 
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American Airlines ASAP 
American Airlines was the first operator to have started ASAP with their pilots in 
the United States aviation history. As of October 2016, the American Airlines is a 
participant in the ASAP with (FAA, 2016):  
 pilots,  
 flight dispatchers,  
 maintenance personnel and  
 flight attendants. 
Airline Statistics 
Total number of aircrafts in service (2016): 928 
Total number of maintenance personnel (2013): 16,800 
Annual Operations Average (2011-2015): 564,865 
MOU Elements. The following elements of MOU were extracted from MOU 
between American Airlines maintenance and engineering, FAA and Transport 
Workers Union (ASAP MOU American Airlines, 2009). 
NOTE: the following elements of MOU have been listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding section. For better presentation purposes, each of those elements 
have been shortened. 
1. Type of operator: Part 121 Air Carrier. 
2. Type of program: The M&E ASAP program, continuing 
program. 
3. Renewal duration: every 2 years. 
4. ERC acceptance for MOU: Accepted. 
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5. Objectives: prevent accidents and incidents. 
6. Enforcement Incentive: offers an alternative to traditional 
FAA legal enforcement and Company disciplinary action. 
7. Statement for evaluation of reports: Yes. 
8.  
a. ASAP records keeper: ASAP Manager.  
b. Shared custody of ASAP reports: between the ERC 
members during an ongoing investigation is required for 
program administration. 
9. FAA reporting period: as required. 
10. Safety related tracking and procedures: Program Manager 
is responsible.  
11. Acceptance of reports: Consensus of ERC. 
12.  
a. ASAP Review Period: Quarterly review. 
b. Review responsibility: Program Manager. 
13. Responsible for oversight:  
a. AA Vice President Safety,  
b. Security and Environmental,  
c. the FAA AMR CMO Office Manager; and  
d. the TWU AA System Coordinator. 
14.  
a. Feedback: The Program Manager is responsible. 
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b. distributing information: ASAP hotline. 
United Airlines 
United Airlines is one of the legacy carriers and one of the major airlines in the 
United States. As of October 2016, United Airlines is a participant of ASAP in 
association with following employee groups (FAA, 2016): 
 Dispatchers 
 Flight Attendants  
 Maintenance  
 Pilot  
 Ramp 
Airline Statistics 
Total number of aircrafts in service (2016): 721 
Total number of inflight services personnel (2015): 26,000 (approx.) 
Annual Operations Average (2011-2015): 467,677 
MOU Elements. The following elements of MOU were extracted from MOU 
between United Airlines Inflight Services, FAA and Council Association of Flight 
Attendants. (United Airlines, 2010) 
NOTE: the following elements of MOU have been listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding section. For better presentation purposes, each of 
those elements have been shortened. 
1. Type of operator: Part 121 Air Carrier. 
2. Type of program: The Inflight Services ASAP (ISAP) program, 
continuing program.  
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3. Renewal duration: Every 2 years. 
4. ERC acceptance for MOU: Accepted. 
5. Objectives: Identify safety events and implement corrective 
measures. 
6. Enforcement Incentive: Use lesser enforcement action or no 
enforcement action. 
7. Statement for evaluation of reports: Yes. 
8.  
a. ASAP records keeper: ISAP Manager.  
b. Shared custody of ASAP reports: Between the ERC 
members during an ongoing investigation is required for 
program administration. 
9. FAA reporting period: not mentioned. 
10. Safety related tracking and procedures: Program Manager is 
responsible.  
11. Acceptance of reports: Consensus of ERC 
12.  
a. ASAP Review Period: Quarterly and 12-month review. 
b. Review responsibility: ERC. 
13. Responsible for Oversight:  
a. A representative from UNITED management,  
b. One representative from Association of Flight Attendants 
(AFA),  
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c. The FAA inspector assigned as the ISAP representative; 
and  
d. The ISAP Manager. 
14.  
a. Feedback: The Program Manager is responsible.  
b. Distributing information: United Flight Attendant 
Operation Manual, Flying Together (web portal). 
Comparison 
The data used for comparison of the ASAPs in Case I has been retrieved from the 
public official documents called MOUs. However, the focus employee group in each 
airline’s MOU used for comparison is different. After several attempts to communicate 
with the company, only these two MOUs (i.e., Maintenance and Engineering ASAP 
MOU for American Airlines and In-flight Attendants ASAP MOU for United Airlines) 
could be retrieved. 
The goal of the comparative study is to understand the differences between the 
ASAP programs among the certificate holders and not the employee groups. Hence these 
two MOUs are considered for comparison although they do not represent a common 
employee group. Elements 4 and 7 have been purposefully sidelined as they were 
focusing on common purposes without which the meaning of ASAP MOU has failed. 
Both elements 4 and 7 were considered unfruitful for the comparison as their existence 
was as common as document titles among the considered ASAP MOUs. Two Additional 
elements have been added to accommodate the replacement for 4 and 7. These elements 
are also the result of changes due to updates in FAA MOU generator: 
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a. Total number of employee participants. 
b. Employee group in focus. 
The following subsections of this section would discuss about the observations 
made and discussion based on Table 3 which lists out the MOU elements among 
American and United Airlines. 
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Table 3 
Comparative analysis summary from ASAP MOUs of Legacy U.S. carriers. 
ASAP MOU 
ELEMENTS 
AMERICAN AIRLINES UNITED AIRLINES 
Type of operator Part 121 air carrier. (Para 
1.1) 
Part 121 air carrier. (Para 1) 
Type of program Continuing program. (Para 
1.1) 
Continuing Program. (Para1) 
Employee group in 
focus 
Maintenance and 
Engineering. (Para 1.1) 
Inflight Services. (Para1) 
Number of employees 
under ASAP 
16.800. (maintenance 
personnel) (2013) 
13,470. (inflight personnel) 
(Para 1) 
Renewal Duration Every 2 years. (Para 5) Every 2 years (Para 2.31) 
Primary ASAP 
Objective 
Prevent accidents and 
incidents by identifying 
safety concerns and 
implementing corrective 
action. (Para 1.2) 
Identify safety events and 
implement corrective 
actions. (Para 2) 
Reporter Incentives FAA will not use the ASAP 
report in any 
subsequent enforcement 
action. (Para 2.5 b) 
Alternative to traditional 
FAA legal enforcement and 
Company disciplinary action. 
(Para 1.5) 
FAA will not use the content 
of the ISAP report in any 
subsequent enforcement 
action. (Para 10.b) 
Use lesser enforcement 
action or no enforcement 
action. (Para 3) 
ASAP records keeper M&E ASAP Manager. (Para 
1.1) 
Inflight services ASAP 
Manager. (Para 2) 
FAA reporting period Quarterly. (Para 2.25) Not mentioned. 
Safety Information 
tracking 
Program Manager. (Para 
2.26) 
Program Manager. (Para 15) 
Acceptance of reports Consensus of ERC. (Para 
2.4) 
Consensus of ERC. (Para 8) 
Program Review Period Quarterly only. (Para 2.25) Quarterly and annually. 
(Para 9.a) 
Review responsibility  Program Manager. (Para 
2.25) 
ERC (9.a) 
Oversight 
Responsibility 
 
a. AA Vice President 
Safety,  
b. Security and 
Environmental,  
a. A representative 
from UNITED 
management,  
b. One representative 
from Association of 
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c. the FAA AMR CMO 
Office Manager; and  
d. the TWU AA System 
Coordinator. 
Flight Attendants 
(AFA),  
c. the FAA inspector 
assigned as the ISAP 
representative; and  
d. the ISAP Manager. 
Feedback 
Responsibility  
Program Manager (Para 
2.23) 
Program Manager (Para 12) 
ASAP information 
distributing method 
Letters, bulletins 
(alerts), posters, and 
newsletter articles. (Para 
2.25) 
United Flight Attendant 
Operation Manual, Flying 
Together Website (Para 13) 
 
Observations. The following observations have been made based on Table 3: 
Two ASAP participants United Airlines and American Airlines have been 
compared with respect to certain MOU elements. It has been observed that both 
the ASAP participants are part 121 operators and follow a continuing type of 
program. 
While employee group in focus for both the airlines are different and 
United Airlines deals with approximately 9,200 more employees under its ASAP 
program. According to their ASAP MOUs, objectives and reporter incentives are 
much similar in both the airlines. Although there is a slight difference in the 
incentives section of the MOUs, both MOUs clearly state that “FAA will not use 
the ASAP report in any subsequent enforcement action”. In terms of record 
keeping and safety information tracking, ASAP manager takes responsibility in 
both of the airlines. 
Review of the program takes place quarterly in case of American, whereas 
United additionally includes an annual review along with the quarterly reviews. 
The review responsibility in both the airlines is taken by different positions. 
  47 
American specify information regarding reporting to FAA about their 
programs periodically in their MOUs. However, this information could not be 
retrieved from United’s MOU. The consensus of the ERC is required to accept an 
ASAP report in both the airlines. 
Responsible positions for safety oversight among the two airlines differs. 
It is also observed that the responsibility for feedback on the reports is taken by 
the program manager in both airlines. However, the safety information 
distributing is taken care by the operations manual and a web portal in United, 
while Letters, bulletins (alerts), posters, and newsletter articles.  hold the key for 
information distribution in American Airlines. 
Discussion. Based on the observations made above, it is evident that both of the 
ASAP participants, United Airlines and American Airlines differ in just two 
MOU elements and similar in the most of them. Objectives stated in both the 
MOUs show that they share a similar goal as the American’s objective (prevent 
accidents and incidents) is just one of the results of United’s objective (identify 
safety events and implement corrective actions). 
Another significant finding has to be the difference between each airline’s 
employee group participation in the ASAP. While United Airlines is participant in 
ASAP for Dispatchers, Flight Attendants, Maintenance Personnel, Pilots and 
Ramp Agents, American Airlines does not involve Ramp Agents for ASAP 
participation. 
There is a slight difference in safety information distribution among the 
two carriers but both the airlines have designated safety manuals fulfilling the 
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purpose. Overall, both the airlines American and United have been visually 
similar in their respective approaches towards installation and functioning of the 
ASAP. 
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Case II – Low Cost Carriers 
In this case, among the LCCs in the U.S., based on the annual operations, 
Frontier, Spirit and Virgin America Airlines have been chosen for the study. The annual 
operations average was taken for 5 years between 2011 and 2015 (See Table 4). The data 
was retrieved from U.S. Department of Transportation website. Table 4 describes the 
comparison of annual operations among Frontier Airlines, Jet Blue, Southwest Airlines, 
Spirit Airlines and Virgin America. 
 
Table 4 
List of LCCs along with their respective average annual flights (2011-2015) 
Airlines Average Annual Flights 
 
Frontier Airlines 
 
Jet Blue 
 
Southwest Airlines  
 
Spirit Airlines 
 
Virgin America  
 
63,895 
 
165,902 
 
1,162,368 
 
67,392 
 
52,352 
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Frontier Airlines ASAP 
Frontier Airlines is a United States low cost carrier headquartered in Denver, 
Colorado, U.S.A. The carrier operates flights to 54 destinations throughout the United 
States and 5 international destinations. As of October 2016, the Frontier Airlines is a 
participant in the ASAP with (FAA, 2016): 
 pilots,  
 flight dispatchers,  
 maintenance personnel and  
 flight attendants. 
Airline Statistics 
Total number of aircrafts in service (2016): 60 
Total number of pilots (2016): 1007 
Annual Operations Average (2011-2015): 63,895 
MOU Elements. The following elements of MOU were extracted from MOU 
between Frontier Airlines, FAA and Frontier ALPA Master Executive Council 
(MEC) through FAA’s automated MOU generator (FAA, 2016).  
NOTE: the following elements of MOU have been listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding section of the document. For better presentation 
purposes, each of those elements have been shortened. 
1. Type of operator: Part 121 Air Carrier. 
2. Type of program: Pilot ASAP program, continuing program.  
3. Renewal duration: every 2 years. 
4. ERC acceptance for MOU: Not Signed. 
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5. Objectives: identify and correct potential safety hazards. 
6. Enforcement Incentive: offers lesser enforcement action or no 
enforcement action. 
7. Statement for evaluation of reports: Yes. 
8.  
a. ASAP records keeper: ASAP Manager.  
b. Shared custody of ASAP reports: between the ERC members 
during an ongoing investigation is required for program 
administration. 
9. FAA reporting period: quarterly (every 3 months). 
10. Safety related tracking and procedures: Program Manager is 
responsible.  
11. Acceptance of reports: Consensus of ERC. 
a. ASAP Review Period: 12-month review. 
b. Review responsibility: ERC. 
12. Responsible for oversight:  
a. A representative from Frontier Airlines management,  
b. One representative from ALPA,  
c. the FAA inspector assigned as the ASAP representative; and  
d. the ASAP Manager. 
13.  
a. Feedback: The ERC is responsible and  
b. distributing information: Frontier Airlines Newsletter 
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Spirit Airlines 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. is an American low-cost carrier, headquartered in Miramar, 
Florida. Spirit operates scheduled flights throughout the United States and in the 
Caribbean, Mexico, Latin America, and South America. As of October 2016, the Spirit 
Airlines is a participant in the ASAP with (FAA, 2016): 
 pilots,  
 flight dispatchers,  
 maintenance personnel  
Airline Statistics 
Total number of aircrafts in service (2016): 91 
Total number of pilots (2016): 1453 
Annual Operations Average (2011-2015): 67,392 
MOU Elements. The following elements of MOU were extracted from MOU 
between Spirit Airlines, FAA and Spirit ALPA MEC through FAA’s automated 
MOU generator (FAA, 2016). 
NOTE: the following elements of MOU have been listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding section. For better presentation purposes, each of those elements 
have been shortened. 
1. Type of operator: Part 121 Air Carrier. 
2. Type of program: Pilot ASAP program, continuing 
program. 
3. Renewal duration: every 2 years. 
4. ERC acceptance for MOU: Not Signed 
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5. Objectives: identify and correct potential safety hazards. 
6. Enforcement Incentive: offers lesser enforcement action or 
no enforcement action. 
7. Statement for evaluation of reports: Yes 
8.  
a. ASAP records keeper: ASAP Manager. 
b. Shared custody of ASAP reports: between the ERC 
members during an ongoing investigation is 
required for program administration. 
9. FAA reporting period: quarterly (every 3 months) 
10. Safety related tracking and procedures: Program Manager 
is responsible. 
11. Acceptance of reports: Consensus of ERC. 
12.  
a. ASAP Review Period: 12-month review. 
b. Review responsibility: ERC. 
13. Responsible for oversight: 
a. A representative from Spirit Airlines management, 
b. One representative from ALPA, 
c. the FAA inspector assigned as the ASAP 
representative; and 
d. the ASAP Manager. 
14.  
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a. Feedback: The ERC is responsible. 
b. distributing information: Spirit Airlines Newsletter. 
Virgin America Airlines 
Virgin America Inc. is a United States-based airline that began service on August 
8, 2007. San Francisco International Airport is Virgin America's main hub, but the airline 
also has focus city hubs at Los Angeles International Airport and Dallas Love Field. As 
of October 2016, the Virgin America Airlines is a participant in the ASAP with (FAA, 
2016): 
 pilots,  
 flight dispatchers,  
 maintenance personnel   
Airline Statistics 
Total number of aircrafts in service (2016): 63 
Total number of pilots (2016): 710 
Annual Operations Average (2011-2015): 52,352 
MOU Elements. The following elements of MOU were extracted from MOU 
between Virgin America Airlines, FAA and Virgin America ALPA MEC through 
FAA’s automated MOU generator (FAA, 2016). 
NOTE: the following elements of MOU have been listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding section. For better presentation purposes, each of those elements 
have been shortened. 
1. Type of operator: Part 121 Air Carrier. 
  55 
2. Type of program: Pilot ASAP program, continuing 
program. 
3. Renewal duration: every 2 years. 
4. ERC acceptance for MOU: Not Signed. 
5. Objectives: identify and correct potential safety hazards. 
6. Enforcement Incentive: offers lesser enforcement action or 
no enforcement action. 
7. Statement for evaluation of reports: Yes. 
8.  
a. ASAP records keeper: ASAP Manager.  
b. Shared custody of ASAP reports: between the ERC 
members during an ongoing investigation is 
required for program administration. 
9. FAA reporting period: quarterly (every 3 months). 
10. Safety related tracking and procedures: Program Manager 
is responsible. 
11. Acceptance of reports: Consensus of ERC 
a. ASAP Review Period: 12-month review. 
b. Review responsibility: ERC. 
12. Responsible for oversight:  
a. A representative from Virgin America Airlines 
management,  
b. One representative from ALPA,  
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c. the FAA inspector assigned as the ASAP 
representative; and  
d. the ASAP Manager. 
13.  
a. Feedback: The ERC is responsible.  
b. distributing information: Virgin America Airlines 
Newsletter. 
Comparison 
The data used for comparison of the ASAPs in Case II has been retrieved from the 
FAA documents called MOUs. Again, there has been an effort to retrieve officially 
signed MOUs from the airlines, labor unions and the FAA. After many unsuccessful 
attempts, all of these unofficial MOUs were retrieved using FAA Automated MOU 
Generator (FAA, 2016). This automated generator creates a demonstration or continuing 
ASAP MOU that fully complies with FAA ASAP guidance, thereby expediting the FAA 
review and acceptance process. 
However, the information used to retrieve MOU from the automated generator 
was provided by ASAP managers and Air Line Pilot Association website making these 
MOUs valid for comparative study. All of the MOUs used in Case II are hence having a 
common employee focus group which is pilots.  
The following subsections of this section would discuss about the observations 
made and discussion based on Table 5 which lists out the MOU elements among Virgin 
America, Frontier and Spirit Airlines.  
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Table 5 
Comparative analysis summary from ASAP MOUs of LCCs in the U.S. 
 
  
  58 
Observations. The following observations have been made based on Table 5: 
Three ASAP participants Frontier Airlines, Spirit Airlines and Virgin America 
have been compared with respect to certain MOU elements. It has been observed 
that all the three ASAP participants are part 121 operators and follow a continuing 
type of program. 
While employee group in focus for all three airlines is pilots, Spirit 
Airlines has the highest number of pilots (1453) among the three under the 
participation of the ASAP. Virgin America on the other hand has the lowest 
number of pilots (710 pilots) as employees under the ASAP program among the 
three. As mentioned in their ASAP MOUs, all three participants differ in their 
objectives, but maintain a similar opinion on reporter incentives. In terms of 
record keeping, Frontier Airlines differs from other two as its ERC is responsible 
for record keeping, while the ASAP managers take responsibility in other two. 
However, for safety information tracking, respective ASAP managers take 
responsibility in all three airlines. 
All three ASAP participants report to FAA about their programs once in 
every 3 months and the program is reviewed annually. The consensus of the ERC 
is required to accept an ASAP report in all the airlines and the ERC also has an 
additional responsibility of the program review in all the three participants. 
The responsible positions for safety oversight among all the three airlines 
is similar. It can also be observed that the ALPA MEC is common for all the three 
as ALPA is a common pilot union for all the three LCCs. ASAP manager of 
Frontier Airlines has an additional responsibility for feedback on the reports, 
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whereas in Spirit Airlines and Virgin America, ERC takes this responsibility. 
ALPA also plays a major role in safety information distribution through its safety 
forums that involves all the three ASAP participants. In addition to that, all the 
three airlines have a periodic newsletter as another means of distributing safety 
information. 
Discussion. Based on the observations made above, we have a similar finding in 
Case II compared to Case I. Here in Case II, the reporter incentives defined by all 
the three airlines is similar. With almost similar number of average annual 
operations (2011-2015), the three LCCs share similar aspects in almost all MOU 
elements. The only difference between each airline’s employee group 
participation in the ASAP is that Frontier Airlines involves flight attendants in 
addition to pilots, dispatchers and maintenance personnel, while the other two 
airlines do not involve flight attendants in ASAP participation.  
If we took a deeper look into the objectives, similar to Case I, all the 
objectives may not have similar wordings but they share a similar goal. The labor 
union involved in all the three airlines is represented by ALPA. This might be the 
very reason for such good number of similarities between the ASAPs. Another 
possible explanation could be that all the ASAP MOUs here are involving pilots.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
Table 6 
List of ASAP participants distinguishing the employee groups participating in ASAP. 
(Source: FAA website) 
 
The comparative qualitative research has been implemented to compare ASAPs 
among the U.S. carriers. The hypothesis statement can be partially rejected considering 
the evidence retrieved from Table 6 which reveals that not all the airlines involve all of 
their employee groups in ASAP participation. From table 6, we can clearly make out that 
not all the airlines follow ASAP participation for the employee groups directly related to 
flight operations. United Airlines is the only legacy carrier from our study that 
implements ASAP for all its employee groups that are directly related to daily flight 
operations. It can be observed that LCCs such as Spirit and Virgin America do not 
involve their flight attendants and ramp agents in their ASAP.   
Airline 
 
Dispatchers Flight 
Attendant 
Maintenance Pilot Ramp 
American Airlines X X X X  
United Airlines X X X X X 
Frontier Airlines X X X X  
Spirit Airlines X  X X  
Virgin America X  X X  
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Case I Result: 
Among the legacy carriers United and American Airlines, a detailed analysis of 
their ASAP MOUs and its elements has revealed that both ASAP programs share 
similarities and slightly differ in a few MOU elements. Hence ASAP programs in this 
cases follow a similar approach according to their MOUs. 
Case II Result: 
Among the LCCs, Virgin America, Spirit and Frontier Airlines showed similar 
results compared to Case I. The detailed analysis of their MOUs have revealed that 
ASAP programs did not differ much as there was just one inconsistent MOU element 
among the three. 
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Table 7- Comparative analysis summary from ASAP MOUs of U.S. Legacy Carriers and 
LCCs – Part 1 
 
  63 
Table 7 Contd. Comparative analysis summary from ASAP MOUs of U.S. Legacy 
Carriers and LCCs – Part 2 
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However, Table 7 here gives us an overall comparison of the ASAP MOU 
elements among the U.S. carriers (both legacy and LCCs). It can be clearly observed that 
the MOU elements are similar on most of elements. However, in regards to ASAP 
participation and some differences in MOUs from Table 7, sufficient evidence suggests 
that the ASAP participants may not have a standardized approach towards the ASAPs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In the U.S. aviation industry, ASAPs has served its purpose in achieving safety 
goals set at the start of the program. This comparative study was an attempt to take a 
deeper dive into the program and its implementation among the U.S. Airlines. While the 
FAA provides guidelines for the installation of ASAP at a particular airline, it has been 
observed that it is up-to the airline of how the ASAP should be implemented at their 
organization. It is also found that an airline can have multiple ASAP programs installed 
within its organization involving various employee communities that have a direct effect 
on the daily flight operations. 
Again, it has been found that at each airline, the number of employee groups 
involved in ASAP participation is different. The detailed analysis of ASAP MOUs has 
revealed that the legacy carriers such as American Airlines and United Airlines have a 
different approach in implementing ASAPs at their companies. However, the LCCs 
haven’t shown much difference in their approach to implement ASAPs when their ASAP 
MOUs have been studied. 
Overall comparison of the ASAP MOUs of both legacy and LCCs has shown 
significant difference among their airlines in implementing ASAPs at their organizations. 
Hence the hypothesis statement “All U.S. Airlines have standardized Aviation Safety 
Action Programs which include all employee groups respectively” can be rejected. This 
study has focused mainly on literature confining to safety reporting systems and their 
development in the U.S. Aviation Industry. 
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LIST OF KEY TERMS (FAA, 2016) 
Administrative Action.  
Under paragraph 205 of FAA Order 2150.3A, Compliance and Enforcement Program, 
administrative action is a means for disposing of violations or alleged violations that do 
not warrant the use of enforcement sanctions. The two types of administrative action are 
a warning notice and a letter of correction.  
Air Carrier.  
A person who undertakes directly, by lease, or other arrangement, to engage in air 
transportation.  
Certificate Holder.  
Refers to a person authorized to operate under 14 CFR Part 121, or who holds a 
certificate issued under 14 CFR Part 145.  
Certificate Holding District Office (CHDO).  
The Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) or Certificate Management Office (CMO) 
having overall responsibility for all FAA reporting requirements, technical administration 
requirements, and regulatory oversight of a certificate holder. Page 2 Par 1 11/15/02 AC 
120-66B. 
Consensus of the ERC.  
Under ASAP, consensus of the ERC means the voluntary agreement of all representatives 
of the ERC to each decision required by the MOU.  
Corrective Action.  
For the purposes of ASAP, corrective action refers to any safety-related action 
determined necessary by the ERC based upon a review and analysis of the reports 
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submitted under an ASAP. Corrective action may involve joint or individual action by the 
parties to the ASAP MOU. 
Enforcement-Related Incentive.  
Refers to an assurance that lesser enforcement action will be used to address certain 
alleged violations of the regulations to encourage participation by certificate holder 
employees. 
Event Review Committee (ERC).  
A group comprised of a representative from each party to an ASAP MOU. The group 
reviews and analyzes reports submitted under an ASAP. The ERC may share and 
exchange information and identify actual or potential safety problems from the 
information contained in the reports. The ERC is usually comprised of a management 
representative from the certificate holder, a representative from the employee labor 
association (if applicable), and a specifically qualified FAA inspector from the CHDO. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  
Refers to the written agreement between two or more parties setting forth the purposes 
for, and terms of, an ASAP. m. Party/Parties. Refers to the certificate holder, the FAA, 
and any other person or entity (e.g., labor union or other industry or Government entity) 
that is a signatory to the MOU.  
Safety-Related Report.  
Refers to a written account of an event that involves an operational or maintenance issue 
related to aviation safety reported through an ASAP. Par 4 Page 3 AC 120-66B 11/15/02  
Voluntary Disclosure Policy.  
  74 
A policy under which regulated entities may voluntarily report apparent violations of the 
regulations and develop corrective action satisfactory to the FAA to preclude their 
recurrence. Certificate holders that satisfy the elements of the Voluntary Disclosure 
Policy receive a letter of correction in lieu of civil penalty action. Voluntary disclosure 
reporting procedures are outlined in the current version of AC 00-58, Voluntary 
Disclosure Reporting Program. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
The Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program partners with 
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and General Aviation Joint Steering 
Committee (GAJSC) to monitor known risk, evaluate the effectiveness of deployed 
mitigations, and detect emerging hazards. ASIAS began in 2007 and now has access to 
185 data sources including voluntary provided safety data. There are currently 45 Part 
121-member air carriers and 20 corporate operators participating in ASIAS. It continues 
to evolve but has matured to the point that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and industry can now leverage voluntarily provided safety data representing 99 percent of 
U.S. air carrier commercial operations.   
ASIAS has access to Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs from 28 
Part 121 air carriers and four corporate operators and Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP) data from flight crews, maintenance, and other employees from 44 Part 121 air 
carriers. ASIAS also accesses reports in the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP), 
which provides air traffic controllers with a way to report potential safety hazards. 
Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) 
ATSAP is an agreement between the FAA, the National Air Traffic Controllers 
Association (NATCA), and the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) 
that fosters a voluntary, cooperative, non-punitive environment for FAA air traffic 
employees to openly report safety concerns. By Order, all personnel providing or directly 
supporting air traffic services are covered, including management. A related Confidential 
Information Sharing Program (CISP) integrates voluntary safety information self-
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reported by pilots and air traffic controllers. This data-sharing program gives the FAA a 
more complete picture of the National Airspace System by collecting, assessing and 
reviewing safety events from the perspective of both pilots and air traffic control.  
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LIST OF DATABASES SEARCHED 
1. ProQuest News & Newspapers 
2. OCLC FirstSearch 
3. EBSCOhost 
4. Cambridge Journals Online 
5. ProQuest 
6. Directory of Open Access Journals 
7. EBSCOhost EJS (Electronic Journals Service) 
8. Emerald Insight 
9. Britannica: Academic Edition 
10. IngentaConnect 
11. University of Chicago Press Journals 
12. ASRS Database Online - Aviation Safety Reporting System 
13. Aviation Accident Database - National Transportation Safety Board 
14. Air Safety Investigation Resource – Databases 
15.  Web of Knowledge 
16. Google Scholar 
17. ProQuest Statistical Insight 
18. PAO- Periodicals Archive Online 
19. Academic Search Premier (EBSCOhost) 
20. World Digital Library 
21. MEDLINE 
22. Periodicals Index Online 
23. Ebrary 
24. Science Direct 
25. JSTOR 
26. Scopus 
27. Project MUSE - Premium Collection 
